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INTRODUCTION

Every morning, billions of people wake up in the developing world
with rising uncertainty about the day ahead. Food, water, shelter, and
safety—none of it is certain. And yet, nearly everyone reading this
Comment rises each morning with thoughts of a run, a podcast, or a
pour-over coffee. Fortunately, international organizations have
answered the uncertainty by financing trillions of dollars of projects in
the developing world, all of which provide countless benefits to the
most vulnerable people. Although the international community has
taken great strides in helping the developing world, significant work
remains to alleviate poverty, child hunger, disease, and many other
critical issues. Still, when development projects occasionally cause
harm, either intentionally or accidentally, those same destitute
populations are left with the bill.
International organizations enjoy unprecedented privileges and
immunities which shield them from the neediest individuals. This
Comment examines the failed immunity and internal accountability
regime of international organizations. By highlighting the unique
characteristics of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, this
Comment proposes wholesale changes to organizational accountability.
For generations, men like Budah Jam have supported their families
by seasonally fishing near the Tragadi harbor off the Kutch coast of
India. 1 Fishing is a family business in the Kutch coast. 2 While men in
the village catch the fish, women in the village clean, dry, and prepare
the fish for market. 3 Villages like Budah’s are severely impoverished;
seasonal fishing is their livelihood. 4
In 2008, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) loaned $450
million to an Indian company for the construction of a coal-fired power
plant in Gujarat. 5 The IFC is an international organization that finances
private-sector development projects under the umbrella of the World

1. Complaint at 6-7, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., No. 15-cv-00612 (D.D.C Apr. 4,
2015), ECF 1.
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 6-7.
4. Id.
5. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2019).
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Bank. 6 Unfortunately, as the IFC concedes, the plant caused tragic
environmental damage to Budah’s village, including the discharge of
thermal pollution into the sea, extensive coal-dust exposure, and
degradation of freshwater sources. 7 As Budah and others in his village
stated, the environmental damage affected the “life and existence” of
over 10,000 fishermen and their families in the region. 8 By all
accounts, the impact was immediate and swift. 9
Beginning in the early 1990s, after increased pressure from various
advocacy and sustainable development groups, international
organizations began establishing internal accountability mechanisms,
hoping to allay the international community’s concerns. 10 In 1999, the
IFC followed suit and established the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman
(CAO). 11 CAO’s mission is to “serve as a fair, trusted, and effective

6. Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, art. I, Dec.
5, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620.
7. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703, 704 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
8. Complaint, Association for the Struggle for Fishworkers’ Rights (MASS) Tata
Mundra Power Plant, 4, India/Tata Ultra Mega-01/Mundra and Anjar (June 11, 2011)
[hereinafter MASS Complaint], http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/documentlinks/documents/TataMundraCAOComplaint_June112011.pdf.
9. See generally EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, FACT SHEET: DESTRUCTIVE TATA
MUNDRA COAL FIRED POWER PLANT [hereinafter FACT SHEET: TATA MUNDRA],
https://earthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/tata_mundra_factsheet-1.pdf (last visited
Nov. 25, 2019).
10. Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complaints and International Organizations: A
Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in International
Financial Institutions, 36 GEO J. INT’L L. 403, 408-09 (2005) (“The change [in
accountability] was happening because of developments in human rights law and
changing views about the environmental and social responsibilities of key decisionmakers and actors. The result was that those who were adversely affected by the
projects began to advocate more vigorously that all decision-makers, including
funding sources, be held accountable for their decisions relating to these projects.”);
see, e.g., Richard E. Bissell & Suresh Nanwani, Multilateral Development Bank
Accountability Mechanisms: Developments and Challenges, 6 MANCHESTER J. INT’L
ECON. L. 2, 6 (2009) (in 1993, as a result of pressure from NGOs, the World Bank
established the World Bank Inspection Panel).
11. Benjamin M. Saper, The International Finance Corporation’s Compliance
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO): An Examination of Accountability and Effectiveness
from a Global Administrative Law Perspective, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1279,
1288 (2012).
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independent recourse and accountability mechanism, and to improve
the environmental and social performance of the [IFC] . . . .” 12
Following the environmental carnage caused by the plant, Budah
and others in his community filed a complaint with the CAO, seeking
relief for the devastation to their environment and livelihood. 13 In 2013,
the CAO completed its investigation and issued a final audit report,
finding that the IFC: (a) failed to comply with environmental and social
impact standards, (b) failed to take reasonable steps to protect the local
community, and (c) failed even in the face of explicit knowledge of the
harms the plant would likely cause. 14 The report also included
extensive recommendations for remedies that would bring the IFC into
compliance with its own standards. 15 Two years later, in 2015, the
CAO issued a monitoring report explaining that the IFC largely ignored
its earlier findings and that the IFC had yet to remedy the issues caused
by the plant. 16 Despite the CAO’s report finding that the IFC failed to
comply with environmental standards or take reasonable steps to
protect the local community, the IFC rendered no monetary relief and
left claimants like Budah with nothing. 17
After the CAO left Budah empty-handed, he and others sought to
hold the IFC accountable in United States (U.S.) federal court by filing
a complaint alleging various tort claims. 18 Unfortunately, as explained
below, Budah’s efforts were stonewalled by an immunity and
accountability scheme with serious, damaging flaws. Instead of leaving
12. OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, OPERATIONAL
GUIDELINES 2 (2013) [hereinafter CAO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES], www.caoombudsman.org/howwework/documentsCAOoperationalGuidelines_2013.pdf.
13. See generally MASS Complaint, supra note 8.
14. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, CAO
AUDIT REPORT OF IFC INVESTMENT IN COASTAL GUJARAT POWER LIMITED, INDIA
(2013),
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/documentlinks/documents/CAOAuditReportC-I-R6-Y12-F160.pdf.
15. See id. at 40 (explaining that the IFC conducted audits of the project and
worked to bring client back into compliance with its obligations).
16. OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, MONITORING OF
IFC’S RESPONSE TO: CAO AUDIT OF IFC INVESTMENT IN COASTAL GUJARAT POWER
LIMITED, INDIA 3-5 (2015), http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/documentlinks/documents/CGPLmonitoringreportJanuary2015.pdf.
17. Complaint Jam, supra note 1, at 51-53.
18. See generally id. Budah’s complaint alleged claims of negligence, trespass,
nuisance, and breach of contract. Id. at 67-80.
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claimants in the dark, the international community should look to one
prior settlement scheme that successfully navigated a complex and
difficult issue: the Tobacco Master Settlement.
In 1998, following years of litigation, forty-six U.S. states entered
into a $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with tobacco
companies. 19 The MSA paved the way for legislation that would
require tobacco companies to deposit certain funds in escrow to secure
payments for future claims. 20 This Comment proposes that the
international community should consider revising its failing
accountability regime by adopting certain characteristics of the MSA.
Specifically, international organizations, subject to certain parameters,
should (a) ensure that a pool of funds is available for claimants suffering
the most extreme, devastating injuries; and (b) create an independent,
binding claims tribunal to hear complaints brought by injured parties.
Instead of drowning claimants in an accountability gap, international
organizations should use their large endowments to right the wrongs
they cause.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and purpose of
international organizations.
Part II explores international
organizations’ immunities, both under international and U.S. law.
Part III examines the CAO’s formation, structure, weaknesses, and
various proposals for improvement. Part IV analyzes the MSA,
including the establishment of escrow statutes. Finally, Part V proposes
a compensation scheme that international organizations can follow,
which is modeled after the MSA.
I. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. History of International Organizations
In 1919, following the First World War, the League of Nations was
established as the modern era’s first significant international

19. Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir.
2007). Payments were to be made over a twenty-five-year period. Id.
20. Frank Sloan & Lindsey Chepke, Litigation, Settlement, and the Public
Welfare: Lessons from the Master Settlement Agreement, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 159,
171 (2011).
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organization. 21 As a general matter, international organizations are
“perhaps the most obvious and typical vehicles for interstate cooperation.” 22 International organizations have various sizes, goals, and
structures. 23
While defining international organizations is a surprisingly difficult
and complex task, 24 organizations share several foundational features. 25
First, international organizations are comprised of member-states that
wield decision-making authority based on their proportionate share of
capital contributions to the organization. 26 Second, international
organizations operate under charters that specify the duties of their
member-states and, critical to the discussion of this Comment, lay out
“certain privileges and immunities of the institutions and their staff
members.” 27 Multi-lateral Development Banks are international
organizations that provide loans to finance economic development
projects. 28 Multi-lateral Development Banks, like the IFC, inevitably
fund projects that result in harm, such as the environmental harm caused
to Budah’s village. This Comment discusses the difficulty in holding
international organizations accountable based on their wide-ranging
privileges and immunities.
The evolution of Multi-lateral Development Banks (MDBs) can be
traced to three distinct generations. 29 The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) marked the first generation. 30
The IBRD was formed to spur economic development outside of
21. JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
LAW 19 (2002).
22. Id. at 28.
23. See id. at 23.
24. See generally id. at 7-13 (explaining that the varying definitions of
international law lead to a lack of consensus about whether international organizations
are subject to customary international law).
25. John W. Head, For Richer or for Poorer: Assessing the Criticisms Directed
at the Multilateral Development Banks, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 241, 249 (2004). It is
important to note that although this Comment mainly deals with MDBs, which are a
type of international organization, these shared characteristics should not be strictly
construed as only applying to MDBs.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 250.
30. Id.
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Europe following the devastation of the Second World War. 31 In 1960,
the International Development Association (IDA) marked the second
generation. 32 The IDA was formed to provide loans to less developed
countries, mainly those that were granted independence through
decolonization. 33 The IBRD and IDA merged, forming the World
Bank. 34 Finally, in 1990, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) marked the third generation. 35 The EBRD was
formed to assist various countries in transitioning from Communist to
Democratic political control. 36
B. Purpose of International Organizations
International organizations, specifically MDBs, generally have a
central focus: economic development. 37 To achieve this goal, the
organizations “provide loans (and some grants) to finance economic
development projects such as roads, irrigation systems, port facilities,
power plants, rural health facilities, teacher training, fertilizer
production, agricultural credit, and institutional strengthening.” 38
Not surprisingly, such a wide array of projects occasionally results
in devastating injuries to local populations. 39 Additionally, as these
projects are only conducted in the developing world, local populations
are significantly less prepared to withstand injuries. 40 Regardless of the
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 251.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id.
See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN,
ANNUAL REPORT 2019, https://cao-ar19.org/CAO-Annual-Report-2019.pdf. In 2018,
the CAO handled sixty new cases of claimants seeking review; however, only twelve
of those have been deemed eligible, with the others under further
investigation. Id. at 2.
40. Richard A. Gosselin et al., Injuries: The Neglected Burden in Developing
Countries, 87 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 246, 246 (2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2672580/pdf/08-052290.pdf (“More
than 90% of injury deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries, where
preventive efforts are often nonexistent, and health-care systems are least prepared to
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magnitude and probability of causing injuries to vulnerable
populations, international organizations largely enjoy wide immunity
from suit. 41
II. IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Methods of Receiving Immunity
Immunities are conferred on an international organization in
several ways. 42 First, the governing charter or treaty establishing the
international organization may include an express immunity provision,
as in the case of the United Nations. 43 Second, international
organizations can enter into separate multilateral treaties that establish
privileges and immunities. 44 Third, as discussed below, member states
may pass legislation conferring immunity on specific international
organizations, similar to the immunity conferred on the IFC by the U.S.
Congress through the International Organizations Immunities Act
(IOIA). 45
International organizations, even in their earliest forms, always
enjoyed certain privileges and immunities, which “enabl[ed] them to
carry out their tasks in an independent fashion. This functional
necessity rationale for a preferential treatment . . . has long dominated
the debate and has rarely been questioned by the courts or other
decision-makers.” 46 The functional necessity doctrine is so widely
accepted that the American Law Institute included it in the Restatement
meet the challenge. As such, injuries clearly contribute to the vicious cycle of poverty
and the economic and social costs have an impact on individuals, communities and
societies.”).
41. See, e.g., International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b)
(2002).
42. August Reinisch, Privileges and Immunities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 132, 135 (Jan Klabbers & Asa
Wallendahl eds., 2011).
43. Id.
44. Id. For example, the Council of Europe and Organization of American States
has passed separate agreements detailing certain privileges and immunities for its
international organizations. Id.
45. See id. at 132-33; see also International Organizations Immunities Act, 22
U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2002).
46. Reinisch, supra note 42, at 132.
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Third of Foreign Relations Law. 47 Essentially, most scholars agree that
international organizations should be given enough immunity as
necessary to carry out their missions.48
B. Organizational Immunity under U.S. Law
and Effects of Jam v. IFC
Toward the end of the Second World War, the United States and its
allies decided that international organizations would be vital for
rebuilding the world’s devastated economic and social framework. 49
To this end, in 1945, Congress passed the IOIA, which provided
international organizations the same immunity from suit as enjoyed by
foreign governments. 50 At the time, foreign governments enjoyed
virtually absolute immunity from suit.51 In 1976, Congress passed the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which provides several
exceptions to foreign government immunity, including an exception for
when the foreign government’s conduct is based on commercial activity
that has a specific connection to the United States. 52
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 467(1) (AM. LAW.
INST. 1987) (“[U]nder international law, an international organization generally
enjoys such privileges and immunities from the jurisdiction of a member state as are
necessary for the fulfilment of the purposes of the organization, including immunity
from legal process, and from financial controls, taxes, and duties.”). The American
Law Institute is the United States’ leading legal organization that prepares “scholarly
work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve the law.” About ALI, AM. LAW.
INST, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). The American Law
Institute also provides the Restatement of the Law, which clarifies the law for courts,
legislatures, and attorneys. Id.
48. Reinisch, supra note 42, at 134. This is known as the functional necessity
rationale. Id.
49. Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering the
Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 471, 487-88
(2008).
50. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2002)
(“International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever located, and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial
process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such
organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings
or by the terms of any contract.”).
51. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 765 (2019).
52. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012) (“A
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States
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Budah’s attempt to hold the IFC accountable in U.S. federal court
eventually reached the Supreme Court of the United States. 53 The
Court considered whether the IOIA forever crystallized the virtually
absolute immunity enjoyed at the time of its passing, or, whether the
FSIA also restricted, by reference, the immunity of international
organizations. 54 The Jam Court held that the FSIA provided
international organizations with the same immunity provided to foreign
governments at the time of the lawsuit; accordingly, the IFC was less
immune from suit than it was in 1945 when the IOIA was passed. 55 The
Court rested its decision on the fact that the most natural interpretation
of the IOIA, under the reference canon of statutory interpretation, is that
the act forever linked the immunity of international organizations with
that of foreign governments. 56 The majority of the Court rejected the
IFC’s argument that restricting immunity in this case would open up
or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such
property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of
the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity
in the United States.”).
53. See generally Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 759-60 (explaining the procedural history
of the case).
54. Id. at 765 (“This case requires us to determine whether the IOIA grants
international organizations the virtually absolute immunity foreign governments
enjoyed when the IOIA was enacted, or the more limited immunity they enjoy
today.”).
55. Id. at 772 (“The International Organizations Immunities Act grants
international organizations the ‘same immunity’ from suit ‘as is enjoyed by foreign
governments’ at any given time. Today, that means that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act governs the immunity of international organizations. The
International Finance Corporation is therefore not absolutely immune from suit.”). In
1945, foreign governments enjoyed “virtually absolute immunity as a matter of
international grace and comity,” because the U.S. State Department adhered to the
“classical theory of foreign sovereign immunity.” Id. at 765-66.
56. Id. at 769 (“The same logic applies here. The IOIA’s reference to the
immunity enjoyed by foreign governments is a general rather than specific reference.
The reference is to an external body of potentially evolving law—the law of foreign
sovereign immunity—not to a specific provision of another statute. The IOIA should
therefore be understood to link the law of international organization immunity to the
law of foreign sovereign immunity, so that the one develops in tandem with the
other.”).

IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ACCOUNTABILITY

PHILLIP ZUNSHINE

2020] IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ACCOUNTABILITY 469
the floodgates to a flood of litigation against international
organizations, thereby defeating the initial purpose of immunity.57
Critically, although the Court sided with Budah and remanded the case
for further proceedings, 58 the District Court found the IFC immune
from suit because none of the FSIA’s immunity exceptions applied. 59
Officials of many international organizations often claim, as the
IFC did in Jam, that social safeguard policies increase costs and impede
lending. 60 However, the IFC has experienced steady growth since the
establishment of its internal accountability mechanism, the CAO. 61
Specifically, in the past decade alone, the IFC’s commitments have
nearly tripled. 62 Further, while restricting immunity may lead to more

57. Id. at 772. Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion largely agreeing with
the IFC’s contention that restricting immunity would lead to a flood of litigation
against international organizations. See id. at 772-87 (Breyer, J. dissenting). However,
numerous facts suggest that restricting organizational immunity would neither have a
chilling effect on the organizations nor open the floodgates to waves of litigation. See
generally Brief of Amicus Curiae of Dr. Erica R. Gould in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants and Reversal, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No.
15-cv-00612) [hereinafter Gould Brief] (arguing that institutional factors and prior
history disprove the IFC’s contention that restrictive immunity would inhibit the
organization’s mission and lead to significant litigation).
58. Once Budah’s case was remanded to the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, the IFC filed a renewed motion to dismiss. See generally Motion to
Dismiss, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., No. 15-cv-00612, (D.D.C June 19, 2019), ECF 40.
59. The FSIA provides several exceptions to immunity, including when the
conduct in question was based on commercial activity with a sufficient nexus to the
United States. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012). On
remand, the District Court found that the commercial activity exception, the only
exception applicable to Budah’s case, did not apply “because the suit is not, as its
core, based upon activity—commercial or otherwise—carried on or performed in the
United States.” Memorandum Opinion, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., No. 15-cv-00612,
(D.D.C Feb. 14, 2020), ECF 61.
60. See Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771-72.
61. See OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, IFC ANNUAL
REPORT 2015 113 (2015) (“IFC’s total resources available consist of paid-in capital,
retained earnings net of designations and certain unrealized gains, and total loan-loss
reserves. The excess available capital, beyond what is required to support existing
business, allows for future growth of our portfolio while also providing a buffer
against unexpected external shocks. As of June 30, 2015, total resources available
reached $22.6 billion, while the minimum capital requirement totaled $19.2 billion.”).
62. Id. at 76 (“In FY15, we invested nearly $4.7 billion in the 78 poorest
countries — those eligible to borrow from the World Bank’s International
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litigation, the number of complaints lodged with the CAO is minimal
to begin with. According to the IFC, the organization received
complaints for only two percent of the projects funded in 2015. 63 With
so few complaints, it is unlikely that restricting immunity would lead to
prohibitively costly litigation.
While greater accountability is needed, international organizations
cannot adequately fulfill their vital missions without certain privileges
and immunities.64 In fact, it is well-accepted that some immunity is
critical for international organizations to succeed. 65 As a general
matter, absent certain rare statutory exceptions, international
organizations are largely immune from suit in U.S. courts. 66 Therefore,
holding international organizations accountable is a complicated
endeavor. 67 International organizations may be held accountable to
their member states, other nations, and contracting parties; however,
non-state actors, like Budah, have frequently been placed in the
“accountability gap.” 68 Fortunately, international law, unlike U.S. law,
provides compelling arguments and precedent for ensuring access to
real, effective remedies. 69

Development Association, or IDA. Our long-term investments in those countries have
more than tripled over the past decade.”).
63. Gould Brief, supra note 57, at 22; Katie Redford, “We Are Above the Law”
— World Bank Asks Supreme Court for Absolute Immunity, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L
(Nov. 5, 2018), https://earthrights.org/blog/we-are-above-the-law-world-bank-askssupreme-court-for-absolute-immunity/.
64. Reinisch, supra note 42, at 573.
65. Id.
66. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2002);
see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012) (outlining
exceptions to the general immunity that foreign governments and international
organizations enjoy).
67. See generally Bradlow, supra note 10, at 405-06 (discussing that
international organizations are usually only accountable to a limited pool of actors).
68. Id. at 405-06 (explaining that this gap is created because there are usually
no contractual relationships between international organizations and non-state actors);
see generally Reinisch, supra note 42, at 573 (discussing the increased awareness of
accountability gaps and the need for limited immunity).
69. See generally Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A
Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2292 (1991) (discussing the procedure of how
international claims used to be brought and resolved).
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C. Organizational Immunity under International Law
Traditionally, non-state actors struggled to hold international
organizations accountable under international law, which was itself
concerned only with the “rights and remedies of states” in their
interactions with each other. 70 International law considered only state
interests, not individual interests. 71 As individuals were not subjects of
international law, claimants were required to first exhaust available
domestic remedies before persuading their own state to commence
diplomatic international efforts on their behalf. 72
However, the aftermath of the Second World War prompted a
remarkable shift in previously state-centered notions of international
law. 73 Following the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals,
international law began recognizing individual rights and official
responsibility. 74 Both tribunals “pierced the veil of state sovereignty
and dispelled the myth that international law is for states only . . . .
Thereafter, private citizens, government officials, nongovernmental
organizations and multinational enterprises could all be rightsholders
and responsible actors under international law.” 75
Under this modern approach, international organizations, as
subjects of international law, are bound by the rules of customary
international law. 76 Additionally, customary international law requires
that international organizations provide injured non-state actors with

70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1964).
73. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2358-89 (1991).
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Daniel D. Bradlow, Using a Shield as a Sword: Are International
Organizations Abusing Their Immunity, 31 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 45, 59 (2017);
see Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt,
Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-91 (Dec. 20, 1980) (“International organizations
are subjects of international law, and as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent
upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under
international agreements to which they are parties.”).
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access to real, effective remedies for their injuries. 77 The right to a
remedy is not a novel concept of international law. 78
Over ninety years ago, the Permanent Court of International
Justice 79 decided the Factory at Chorzow case, a cornerstone case in
the development of international reparations. The court held that “it is
a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law,
that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation.” 80
Beginning in 1947, the United Nations expressly sought to diminish
the “accountability gap” by requiring otherwise immune organizations
to provide appropriate modes of settlement for disputes with non-state
actors. 81 In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
specifically stated that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective
remedy . . . for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him.” 82
In 1976, the international community accepted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political rights, which provides that “any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have
an [e]ffective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 83 Further, the
covenant provides that those claimants “shall have [their] right[s] . . .

77. See DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
182 (1999).
78. Id.
79. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was an international
court attached to the League of Nations. The PCIJ disbanded in 1946. The Permanent
Court of International Justice, INT’L CT. OF JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/history
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
80. Factory at Chorzow, Judgment (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17,
¶ 73 (Sept. 13, 1928) (emphasis added); see generally Brief of International Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for Certiorari at 16, Jam v. Int’l
Fin. Corp. (No 17-1011) (discussing the foundational principle derived from Factory
of Chorzow that makes international organizations subjects of international law).
81. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies,
art. IX, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 521 (“Each specialized agency shall make
provision for appropriate modes of settlement of . . . [d]isputes arising out of contracts
or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party . . . .”).
82. G.A. Res 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8 (Dec.
10, 1948).
83. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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determined by competent judicial, administrative . . . authorities, or by
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State.” 84
A majority of the international community has signed and ratified
treaties holding that international law requires providing an effective
remedy for relief. 85 As a subject of international law, the IFC and other
international organizations must provide injured, non-state actors with
access to real remedies. Unfortunately for Budah and others affected
by IFC funded projects, the IFC’s international accountability
mechanism, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, fails to provide real,
effective remedies, despite customary international law.
III. THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN
A. Establishment of the CAO
The World Bank is comprised of the IFC, International Bank of
Reconstruction and Development, International Development
Association, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 86 The
United States is the largest donor to the IFC, contributing nearly one
quarter of the organization’s capital. 87 The IFC is one of the two bodies
of the World Bank that finances private-sector projects in the
developing world. 88 In 1999, the CAO was established to advise IFC
management on compliance with the organization’s social and
84. Id.
85. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Daniel Bradlow in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants at 13-14, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 15cv-00612) [hereinafter Bradlow Brief] (describing how the following international
treaties include right to remedy principles: International Convention on Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; American Convention on Human Rights;
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Arab Charter on Human Rights;
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms; ASEAN Human Rights Declaration; Vienna Declaration and Program of
Action).
86. Saper, supra note 11, at 1282.
87. Id. at 1283 n.10 (citing Susan Park, Becoming Green: Diffusing Sustainable
Development Norms Throughout the World Bank Group, in THE WORLD BANK AND
GOVERNANCE: A DECADE OF REFORM AND REACTION 168, 173 (Diane Stone &
Christopher Wright eds., 2007).
88. Id. at 1283. The other body of the World Bank that does such work is the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Id.
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environmental policies. 89 Some believe the IFC formed the CAO in
response to the increasing pressure from advocacy groups, the IFC’s
own board of directors, and the inadequate internal investigation of a
prior damaging project in Chile. 90
B. The CAO’s Roles and Procedures
The CAO is governed by its operational guidelines. 91 It has three
separate, distinct roles: (1) the compliance branch audits projects to
ensure compliance with IFC social and environmental policies, (2) the
advisory branch advises management concerning certain projects, and
(3) the ombudsman branch responds to complaints and attempts to
resolve issues. 92 The ombudsman is the only branch that allows private
citizens to file complaints alleging social or environmental damages
caused by IFC funded projects. 93
CAO complaints are first screened for eligibility before a full
assessment is conducted of the issues. 94 Subsequently, the parties have
an opportunity to agree to a joint resolution or seek a compliance
appraisal. 95 If the parties reach an agreement, the CAO assists in
monitoring to ensure the terms of the agreement are fulfilled. 96
89. Id. at 1290. In the 1990s, the IFC financed the Pangue Hydroelectric dam
project in Chile. The project displaced and impacted several indigenous communities.
According to the IFC, “no other project in the history of the IFC has led to such
ongoing controversy, and far-reaching institutional change.” INT’L FIN. CORP.,
LEARNED;
PANGUE
HYDROELECTRIC,
LESSONS
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/6a808313-bf7a-4d36-b49feaf5ea4bfc6d/pangue_summary.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKS
PACE-6a808313-bf7a-4d36-b49f-eaf5ea4bfc6d-jqeEQqr (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
90. Bissell & Nanwani, supra note 10, at 15.
91. See generally CAO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §1.1 (“To
carry out its mandate, it is essential that CAO be able to work in a flexible manner
and retain its discretion. While these Guidelines provide a procedural framework to
inform CAO, the complainant, and those engaged in a CAO process, they are not
intended to unduly restrict CAO.”).
92. Bissell & Nanwani, supra note 10, at 15-16.
93. Id. at 16.
94. CAO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §2.4. This preliminary step
takes around 15 working days. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. §3.2.3 (“This may be achieved by setting mutually agreed timelines and
outcome indicators within the body of the agreement.”).

IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ACCOUNTABILITY

PHILLIP ZUNSHINE

2020] IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ACCOUNTABILITY 475
C. Lack of Independence, Fairness, and Binding Authority
Most international organizations view their internal accountability
mechanisms as tools for improving operational effectiveness, rather
than providing effective remedies to injured parties. 97 Although the
CAO provides increased accountability, it fails to provide a real,
effective remedy. 98 For instance, some claimants are not given
opportunities to rebut arguments advanced by IFC management.99
Additionally, the CAO is not definitively independent because IFC
senior management holds final decision-making powers. 100 Critically,
the CAO’s finding and recommendations are non-binding; therefore,
the IFC is free to follow its own path. 101
Many organizations’ accountability mechanisms suffer from
various defects including lack of transparency, lack of democratic
processes, and overall inadequacy; therefore, the public largely refuses
to believe that international organizations are accountable. 102 Professor
Daniel Bradlow, a leading scholar of international organization
accountability, posits that international organizations “use the doctrine
of international-organization immunity—originally intended to be a
shield to protect it from interference from member states—as a sword
for warding off the claims of those who are adversely affected by its
actions.” 103 Professor Bradlow is far from the only voice seeking to fix
this issue.
D. Calls for Change
Numerous international law scholars have advanced options for
improving international organization accountability. Eisuke Suzuki
and Suresh Nanwani propose that claims should proceed directly to the
organization’s administrative tribunal, which generally hears contract
97. Eisuke Suzuki & Suresh Nanwani, Responsibility of International
Organizations: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral Development
Banks, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 177, 181 (2005).
98. Bradlow Brief, supra note 85, at 22-23.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Herz, supra note 49, at 483.
103. Bradlow Brief, supra note 85, at 24.
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and employment claims. 104 Gerhard Thallinger proposes that domestic
courts should deny the organization’s immunity if the court determines
the organization has failed to provide adequate quasi-judicial remedies
or access to an administrative tribunal. 105 Dana Clark proposes that
accountability mechanisms should focus more on problem-solving and
providing real, effective relief, rather than on investigating the projects’
compliance with organizational policies. 106 Enrique R. Carrasco and
Alison K. Guerney propose the creation of an Office of Claims
Resolution which would initially handle claims and potentially refer the
claims to an arbitration panel empowered to award damages. 107 Finally,
Professor Bradlow proposes numerous methods and frameworks for
potential reforms of accountability mechanisms. 108
The above proposals offer excellent options for increasing
accountability; however, they do not ensure binding, remedial measures
for injured non-state actors. Critically, none of the proposals mandate
U.S. legislative involvement, which is likely necessary for a
meaningful, systemic improvement of international organizational
accountability. 109 This Comment’s proposal is modeled after the
successful Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, which involved
legislation requiring funds be made available for payment of future
claims.

104. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 97, at 224 & n.212.
105. Gerhard Thallinger, Piercing Jurisdictional Immunity: The Possible Role
of Domestic Courts in Enhancing World Bank Accountability, 2 VIENNA ONLINE J. ON
INT’L CONST. L. 4, 30 (2008).
106. Dana L. Clark, The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater
Accountability, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 224-26 (2002).
107. Enrique R. Carrasco & Alison K. Guernsey, World Bank’s Inspection
Panel: Promoting True Accountability through Arbitration, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
577, 616-18 (2008).
108. See generally Bradlow, supra note 10, at 462-86 (proposing reforms
including an inspection committee, a full-time inspection panel, and a “virtual”
inspection panel).
109. According to the IFC’s latest financial statements, the United States
contributes twenty-two percent of the organization’s capital stock, more than any
other country. INT’L FIN. CORP., FINANCIALS 2019 59 (2019),
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corpora
te_Site/Annual+Report/Financials/Financial-Reporting/.
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IV. THE TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
A. History of Tobacco Litigation and the MSA
From the 1950s to the 1990s, various plaintiffs tried, largely
unsuccessfully, to initiate litigation against tobacco companies. 110
Although tobacco companies enjoyed no immunity from suit, lawsuits
were doomed for two primary reasons. First, at the time, plaintiffs
lacked sufficient scientific evidence linking smoking with various
diseases. 111 Later, even once scientific evidence proved a sufficient
causal link, juries were unsympathetic to plaintiffs that well understood
the inherent dangers of smoking. 112
Starting in the mid-1990s, parties to class action lawsuits and
medical care recovery suits successfully reached settlements with
various tobacco companies. 113 Specifically, lawsuits filed by State
Attorneys General had unprecedented success, seeking recovery for
medical costs. 114 In 1997, the states enjoyed a banner year for tobacco
lawsuit settlements with Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota
each settling cases for between three and fifteen billion dollars. 115
Class action lawsuits were even a greater success, as exemplified by a
class of 500,000 Florida smokers that was awarded $145 billion in
punitive damages. 116
In 1998, forty-six states entered into the MSA with the four largest
tobacco manufacturers requiring a $206 billion payout over twenty-five
years. 117 The MSA divided tobacco companies into three distinct
groups: (1) the Original Participating Manufacturers (OPMs), which
included the original parties to the MSA; (2) the Subsequent
Participating Manufacturers (SPMs), which included any tobacco
companies later signing the MSA; and (3) Non-Participating

110. Sloan & Chepke, supra note 20, at 163.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 164.
113. Id. at 164-65.
114. Id. at 165.
115. Id. at 166.
116. Id. at 167. One reason for such a high reward was that the “jury cited the
industry’s blatant fraud and misrepresentation as the basis for liability.” Id.
117. Grand River Enter. Six Nations, 481 F.3d at 63.
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Manufacturers (NPMs), which included other tobacco manufactures
not party to the MSA. 118
B. Establishment of Escrow Statutes
Critically, most NPMs were not in the U.S. market when the MSA
was signed; therefore, the NPMs would not be subject to U.S. federal
court jurisdiction until they conducted business in the United States.119
To prohibit NPMs from receiving a competitive advantage due to the
settlement costs imputed to OPMs and SPMs, the MSA required that
states pass statutes (Escrow Statutes) compelling NPMs to deposit
funds in escrow as security for future lawsuits. 120
The MSA included an example of an Escrow Statute that each state
must enact. 121 The Escrow Statute required NPMs to deposit funds
relative to cigarettes sold within each respective state. 122 NPMs were
allowed to retain and invest interest earned on the escrow funds into
extremely safe investments. 123 Finally, the NPMs could withdraw any
funds in excess of minimum escrow requirements as defined in the
MSA. 124
C. Learning from the Success of the MSA
Although scholars frequently highlight several shortfalls of the
MSA, 125 the agreement marked significant success in litigation against
tobacco companies.
Many institutional factors contributed to
118. Sloan & Chepke, supra note 20, at 170-71. This Comment will not focus
on OPMs or SPMs.
119. Id. at 171.
120. Id.
121. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT,
EXHIBIT
T
(Nov.
1998),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/tobacco/1msa.pdf [hereinafter MSA].
122. Id. For example, beginning in 2007 and each year after, tobacco companies
were to deposit into escrow “$.0188482 per unit sold after the date of enactment of
this Act.” Id.
123. Id. (“A tobacco product manufacturer that places funds into escrow . . .
shall receive the interest or other appreciation on such funds as earned.”).
124. Id.
125. See generally Sloan & Chepke, supra note 20, at 223-26 (discussing six
major shortfalls of the MSA).
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previously unsuccessful litigation, including the overwhelming
influence held by large tobacco companies and their deep pockets. 126
The MSA provided effective relief to the injured parties and provided
governments with billions of dollars in funding for various state
programs, including healthcare and education. 127
Instead of merely improving pre-existing features of various
internal accountability mechanisms, as proposed by numerous scholars,
this Comment proposes a wholesale shift in accountability. Although
immunity is a critical component of international organization
effectiveness, the fact remains that injured non-state actors are left
without a real, effective remedy for their meritorious claims.
Vulnerable individuals such as Budah cannot afford to be left out in the
rain.
A key as to why the MSA might be an effective way to address the
accountability of international organizations, as it was with tobacco
companies, lies in the commonality of the power disparity that each
entity possesses. Tobacco companies are large, powerful institutions
with significant advantages over injured individuals. Similarly, the
economic and power disparity between massive international
organizations and claimants from the developing world creates unique
accountability challenges. The MSA offered a unique solution to the
confounding problem of holding tobacco companies accountable. As a
result, the international community should consider adopting several
characteristics of the MSA to improve international organization
accountability.

126. Tobacco companies used a variety of strategies block regulations around
the world, including political funding, intelligence gathering, intimidation, and even
bribery. The 1990s saw a cigarette exportation increase of 260%. Yussuf Saloojee &
Elif Dagli, Tobacco Industry Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health, 78
BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 902, 902-04 (2000),
https://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/78%287%29902.pdf.
127. See Sloan & Chepke, supra note 20, at 215.
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V. MODELING A REMEDY AFTER THE MSA
A. Requirements of International Organizations
1. Common Relief Accounts

As a condition for retaining immunity, each international
organization should be required to comply with a compensation scheme
modeled after the MSA. For every financed development project, the
organization must deposit a corresponding amount in an escrow-like
account called a Common Relief Account (CRA). The funds deposited
in CRAs will be used to secure payment of future claims. Organizationapproved algorithms will determine the amount to be deposited into
CRAs. The algorithms will incorporate a variety of factors including:
(a) the riskiness of the project; (b) the scope of potential harm; (c) the
size of the organization’s operating budget; (d) the organization’s
history of damage causing projects; and (e) the level of immunity
afforded to the organization by the laws of the claimant’s jurisdiction.
As mentioned above, the United States is the largest single
contributor to many international organizations. Accordingly, the U.S.
Congress should amend the IOIA to require establishment of CRAs.
Otherwise, international organizations will not be sufficiently
motivated to join this compensation scheme. 128
Legislation
conditioning immunity on establishment of CRAs will hold
international organizations’ feet to the fire and ensure adequate
accountability.
Additionally, just as the MSA allows NPMs to retain and invest
interest earned on the escrow funds into safe investments, international
organizations will be allowed to invest CRA funds into certain safe, preapproved investments. International organizations will only be
permitted to invest certain CRA funds over a minimal threshold, set by
the above described algorithms. To ensure CRA funds are properly
distributed, claims must first be decided by an adjudicative body.

128. See Saper, supra note 11, at 1325 (noting that significant improvements to
internal accountability mechanisms will require “hard” force, including potential
action from member states).
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2. Claims Tribunal
Similar to the establishment of CRAs, the U.S. Congress should
amend the IOIA to require organizations to form an independent,
neutral, and binding administrative tribunal (Claims Tribunal) that will
hear claims brought by injured parties. Unlike the CAO, which has no
binding authority over the IFC, the Claims Tribunal must be given
binding authority to direct the release of CRA funds to claimants. The
Claims Tribunal will consist of a three-member panel, including
representatives from various international arbitration companies. To
ensure independence, the arbiters must not have any prior connections
with the organization or its leaders.
The Claims Tribunal will receive evidence from both parties in an
open, recorded, and transparent process. Each proceeding of the Claims
Tribunal must be videotaped, except for valid security and privacy
concerns. Once both sides present their factual evidence, each party
will have an opportunity for rebuttal. Once the Claims Tribunal hears
all testimony and receives all evidence, the tribunal will issue its order
either directing the release of certain CRA funds or denying the
complaint. In the interest of efficiency, all Claims Tribunal orders will
be final and non-appealable.
B. Requirements for Claimants
1. Exhaust Domestic Remedies
CRA funds will not be made available to every claimant seeking
damages from international organizations. Qualifying for CRA funds
should be a difficult, though not impossible, process. First, claimants
seeking CRA funds must sufficiently exhaust all available domestic
remedies against the international organization. 129 Requiring claimants
to exhaust available judicial remedies ensures that this compensation
scheme does not fracture certain established international norms.130
Court systems around the world allow for varying degrees of access to
claimants. For instance, as discussed above, the U.S. Congress and U.S.
courts have extended subject matter jurisdiction to claimants if a
129. Domestic remedies will include judicial process in the state where the harm
was done and the state where the organization is headquartered.
130. One such norm being immunity.
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statutory immunity exception applies. For example, in Budah’s case,
before qualifying for CRA funds, Budah would be required to exhaust
all available remedies in both Indian and U.S. courts, in the event that
either jurisdiction finds a waiver of immunity or a statutory immunity
exception. Allowing claimants to access CRA funds without first
proceeding in their respective domestic jurisdiction would trample on a
state’s ability to regulate its judicial system.
2. Allege Sufficient Damages
Claimants must allege sufficiently extensive damages for access to
the Claims Tribunal. For example, monetary damages of $5 million
dollars may establish requisite harm. 131 This restriction allows CRA
funds to be used for only the most serious claims, usually those that
affect vast groups of people, like in Budah’s case. If CRA funds were
available to every claimant, international organizations would
effectively be stripped of any immunity. Additionally, individuals in a
struggling, developing country could be motivated to pursue frivolous
claims if aware of potential compensation. Restricting access to the
most damaging cases ensures that international organizations retain
necessary functional immunity, while allowing devastated claimants
access to critical compensation funds.
C. Advantages of the CRA Proposal
Unlike previous proposals for improving accountability, this
proposal requires U.S. legislation for the establishment of CRAs and
Claims Tribunals. Enacting legislation is a difficult, costly, and
arduous task; however, the weight behind legislative mandates is
significant, especially in the field of international organizations. As
mentioned above, the United States and its allies jumpstarted the role
of international organizations following the devastation of the Second
World War. Ever since, the United States has positioned itself as a
world leader with many critical international organizations. If U.S.
legislation compelled the funding of CRAs and Claims Tribunals,

131. This minimum damage requirement is used to ensure that international
organizations are not flooded with numerous minor lawsuits seeking funds from the
CRA.
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international organizations around the world would be forced to
comply.
Additionally, this proposal provides claimants with access to a real,
effective remedy for their injuries while, at the same time, allows
organizations to largely retain the functional immunity necessary to
carry out their core tasks. Instead of opening the doors to waves of
costly, time-consuming litigation, organizations would consider claims
through their Claims Tribunals. Given the minimum damage
requirement, organizations would only be responsible for the most
devastating injuries.
D. Potential Issues
Although this proposal establishes a mechanism for holding
international organizations accountable, there might be numerous
potential issues. First, the algorithm used to determine the CRA amount
requirement may not be able to accurately predict eventual harm. For
instance, a project could appear relatively safe from a preliminary
review, only to turn costly, even deadly, in unexpected ways.
Second, the adjudication of claims may present numerous
challenges. Unlike the CAO, which simply reviews the facts and
determines if the IFC complied with environmental and social
standards, this proposal requires that international organizations create
Claims Tribunals to fairly adjudicate claims and determine if access to
CRA funds is warranted. However, it remains unclear how the Claims
Tribunals will handle, among other concerns, evidentiary and legal
representation issues. While resolution of these issues is critical to the
effectiveness of this proposal, specific solutions are best left to an
international community keen on improving accountability.
Additionally, it remains unclear to what extent the international
community will be able to force international organizations to establish
CRAs and Claims Tribunals. U.S. legislation might be a significant
step in improving accountability; however, because international
organizations are governed by charters and comprised of member states
from around the world, the United States cannot unilaterally force this
proposal. Therefore, any significant change will require charter
amendments and member states consensus. Without a doubt,
establishment of CRAs and Claims Tribunals will increase costs and
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operating budgets of international organizations. However, the cost
placed on injured populations will likely outweigh operational costs.
CONCLUSION
International organizations serve vital interests for the international
community. The developing world is forever indebted to the great work
done by many international organizations. Additionally, international
organizations cannot adequately fulfill their missions without some
level of privileges and immunities. However, in developing countries,
the likelihood of harm to vulnerable individuals is increased because
they lack sufficient resources to mitigate injuries caused by projects
financed by international organizations. On the other hand, fortunate
citizens of the developed world enjoy several institutional safety nets,
such as insurance, greater mobility, and significantly higher wages, all
of which prevent injuries from having otherwise catastrophic effects.
On the other hand, Budah and others in the developing world
struggle daily to provide their families with basics necessities such as
food, water, and shelter. To make matters worse, environmental
damage frequently exacts harsher injuries on impoverished societies
whose survival is closely linked to natural resources. While noble in
spirit and mission, international organizations should not escape
liability simply because of their unique non-governmental status.
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Claimants like Budah deserve access to a system that will provide
a fair and independent adjudication of their claims and a real, effective
remedy for relief. When injuries are caused by a project funded by the
deep pockets of an international organization, the organization should
be held accountable. This proposal allows international organizations
to largely retain their necessary immunity while providing claimants
effective relief when warranted. Establishing CRAs and Claims
Tribunals is the first step toward minimizing the accountability gap. If
international organizations truly strive to improve the developing
world, they should remedy their wrongs. 132
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